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the several states. It seems to be a subtle avoidance of the rule of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 23 which would permit the federal courts, in
any instance absent a very recent state decision, to acknowledge
stare decisis as but a guide post, and then reverse the highest state
courts according to their own determinations. By replacing the dis-
cretion of the state court with its own, a federal court can effectively
reverse a state supreme court. This raises several final points of
inquiry. Will federal courts follow their own precedents in the
future? Will they extend Caporossi to avoid Erie R.R. entirely? Will
we return to the chaos of Tyson's rule? Will state high courts be
bound by federal court reversals of the judgments?
MICHAEL D. BAUDHUIN
Contracts: Restitution as a Remedy for Breach-Plaintiff,
a professional engineer, entered into an oral agreement to provide
plans and specifications for a proposed motel on land owned by the
defendant. Relying upon defendant's representations and a plot survey
provided by him, the plaintiff submitted preliminary plans for the
proposed building which incorporated land not belonging to the de-
fendant. This land was needed to provide parking facilities required
by the city building code. The defendant's attempts to purchase
additional property and to obtain a building permit were unsuccessful,
and the defendant was unable to secure the necessary financing. As a
result, the project was dropped. Plaintiff submitted a bill for services
performed, and upon defendant's refusal to pay, the plaintiff sued for
services rendered. Barnes v. Lozoff. 1 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
affirmed the lower court allowing plaintiff to recover the reasonable
value of his services. The court held that there was no fault on the
plaintiff's part in preparing the preliminary sketches and that such
sketches were a part of the bargained-for performance, thus bring-
ing the case within section 347 of the Restatement of Contracts.2
The city authority relied on by the court in Barnes suggests that
the decision rests on restitution as a remedy for a breach of contract.3
Restitution in this sense lies as an alternative remedy to a suit on the
contract for damages. The purpose of this remedy is to restore the
injured party to as good a position as was occupied by him prior to
23 Ibid.
1 Barnes v. Lozoff, 20 Wis. 2d 644, 123 N.W. 2d 543 (1963).
2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS §347 (1932) Restitution of Value of a Performance
Rendered By One Party as a Remedy For Total Breach by the Other.
3 Guentrer v. Gragi, 258 Wis. 383, 46 N.W. 2d 194 (1957); Palak v. Kramer,
116 Conn. 688, 166 AtI. 396 (1933) ; Sterling v. Marshall, 54 A. 2d 353 (Wash.
D.C., Mun. Ct. of App. 1947); Parrish v. Taltaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P. 2d
642 (1957).
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the making of the contract.4 The availability of the remedy requires
the presence of the following elements:
1. The contract must be enforceable, that is, an action must lie for
damages in case of a breach.5
2. There must be a substantial breach so as to justify decision.0
3. The injury done to the plaintiff must be in the form of
(a) part performance for which the defendant has bargained, or
(b) a benefit which the defendant has actually received.7
There is a conflict among text writers on the question of whether
or not this restitutional remedy is quasi-contractual in nature. The
majority seem to feel that it is not strictly quasi-contractual., In fact,
restitution, as a remedy for contract breach, is clearly distinguishable
from an action in quasi-contract based upon the theory of unjust
enrichment, the elements of recovery being quite different. Recovery
in quasi-contract, based on the theory of unjust enrichment, arises in
non-contract situations and under a contract which is unenforceable
where justice and conscience require compensation to be given for
property or services rendered Recovery in this situation is allowed
owing to the unjust enrichment of the defendant which is measured
by the value of the benefit retained by the defendant. Unjust enrich-
ment thus requires the actual transfer of benefit from the plaintiff
to the defendant and an increase in the wealth of the latter. This
concept of benefit differs from that in the case of restitution, as a
remedy for breach, wherein recovery will be allowed even though
there has been no actual transfer of benefit to the defendant if the
part performance of the plaintiff was part of the bargained-for per-
4The remedy of money damages for breach is intended to put the injured party
in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been fully
performed. See Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages.
46 YALE L. J. 52, 53-54 (1937), wherein the authors define three purposes for
which contract damages are awarded, thus defining the three basic contract
interests-the expectancy interest, the restitution interest, and the reliance
interest. The reliance interest is the one which is discussed in the Barnes case.
5 5 CORBIN, CoNTRACrS §1102 (1951).65 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1104 (1951). Professor Corbin points out that the
rescission requirements merely give evidence of the fact that the breach is,
in the words of §347 of the Restatement of Contracts, a total breach.
7RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §348 (1932).85 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1106 (1951). SIMPSON, CONTRAs §154 (1954). WooD-
WARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACT §260 (1913). 5 WILLISToN, CoNTRAcTs
§1454 (1937. Dawson, Restitution or Damages, 20 OHIo ST. L. J. 175, 189
(1959).
9 An action in quasi-contract based on the theory of unjust enrichment will lie
where the contract is unenforceable in the following instances: (The section
citations are to WILLISTON, CONTRACtS (1937)) because of infancy §240, mar-
ried women §270, or an insane person §255; where the right to recover bene-
fits furnished under an ultra vires contract exists §271, where a contract is
voidable under the Statute of Frauds §§534-538; when benefits are conferred
under a contract unenforceable because of impossibility or frustration of
purpose §1972 et. seq.; and in cases of fraud §1525, mistake §1542, duress§1623, or illegality §§1787-1791.
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formance.10 Benefit in this latter sense seems to rest on the principle
that the law will acknowledge, as benefit, what the parties to the
contract have called benefit, whether or not the performance of the
promisor will increase the estate of the promisee."
While the authority relied on in Barnes strongly suggests that
recovery was allowed on the theory of restitution as a remedy for
breach of contract, the court did not expressly make a finding as to
the presence of the elements of this remedy. The court, therefore,
left the door open to speculation on whether its decision was in fact
made upon a finding of quasi-contract based upon the theory of
unjust enrichment.
As has been pointed out, the enforceability or unenforceability of
the engineer's contract is a vital question, for if the agreement is
unenforceable, restitution will not lie as a remedy for contract breach.
There are facts to suggest in the present case that the agreement
made between Barnes and Lozoff was unenforceable. If the fault as
to the lack of available parking facilities was equally shared by both
the parties, then it may be argued that the contract was impossible of
performance and, owing to this impossibility, was rendered unen-
forceable. This seems unlikely, however, since it would appear from
the opinion of the court that the fault lay with the defendant. Another
view of the facts in the Barnes case which could give rise to a finding
of unenforceability is that the plans, as rendered, made the contract
illegal. The building code of the city required that enough land be
available so as to provide a parking space for every unit in the motel.
The plan submitted by the plaintiff could thus be argued to have been
illegal when applied to the proposed site, as a violation of the building
code requirements. This theroy upon further analysis also seems un-
tenable, however, for the preparation of plans and specifications was
not malum in se. The building as planned was simply malul prohi-
bitum. Therefore, the agreement itself is not illegal so as to render it
unenforceable.' 2 A third view of the facts suggest that the contract in
Barnes was unenforceable because of a mistake. It appears that plain-
tiff began his work relying upon a mistake of fact-namely, that the
available land was that as represented by the defendant.
All three of the aforementioned theories of unenforceability also
require another finding before the court, in a situation such as that
presented by the Barnes case, could properly allow recovery in quasi-
20 Note 2 supra and RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS §348 (1932).
"See Dawson, Restitution of Damages, 20 OHIo ST. L. J. 175, 190 (1959), cited
in Barnes v. Lozoff, supra note 1 at 651, 125 N.W. 2d at 547.
12 See Weiser v. Stadium of Carnarsie, 244 N.Y.S. 61, 137 Misc. 881 (1930),
wherein the court found that preparation of plans for a building did not
render the agreement illegal even though, on its proposed site, it would have
violated the zoning requirements.
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contract upon the theory of unjust enrichment. The prevention of
unjust enrichment requires that the defendant give something back to
plaintiff, and this cannot be done unless he has received something
of value. In the Barnes case, there was no actual transfer of benefit
to the defendant. The defendant received nothing except bargained-for
performance which in no way enriched his estate or increased his
wealth at the plaintiff's expense.' 3
Based upon the preceding analysis of these two distinct remedies,
it would appear that the only theory upon which the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin could have allowed recovery in Barnes was that of
restitution, as a remedy for breach of contract. A loss which was
suffered by the plaintif therein, where there has been no actual
transfer of benefit to the defendant, is recoverable only when found
to be suffered in part performance of the contract.14
The complexity of the law in the area of restitution can probably
best be traced to the type of loss which was suffered by plaintiff in
the Barnes case and the various treatments given to it by the courts.
Some modern legal writers believe that this type of loss should be
recoverable in a wider variety of situations than it is at present.' 5
Further difficulty comes when the courts speak of benefit. This con-
cept will of necessity take on a greater variety of meanings as the
theory upon which restitution is allowed changes.' 6
Restitution as an alternative remedy for breach of contract is more
than a mere backstop for an action for money damages; it stands in
its own right as a form of relief available to a party injured by a
breach. Assuming the presence of the elements of this remedy, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Barnes has properly applied this restitu-
tional theory to the facts. However, by ignoring necessary assumptions
and applying other theories, which have been shown to fit the facts,
the case gives rise to a situation wherein recovery should have been
denied. It must be assumed, therefore, that the elements of the remedy
of restitution for a contract breach are present in the Barnes decision;
otherwise, the decision stands as an incorrect application of the law
of quasi-contract. PAUL J. CLULO
'3However, see Olephant v. Kalman, 35 N.Y.S. 2d 354 (1942), wherein the
court allowed recovery in restitution where the contract was unenforceable
due to the intervention of a third party. The court awarded the plaintiff the
reasonable value of his services even though the defendant in no way benefited
from the plaintiff's performance.
14 In both of the actions of restitution, as a remedy for breach and quasi-contract
based on unjust enrichment, recovery will not be allowed where a promisee
expends labor and materials in preparation prior to actual performance on the
contract. However, in the alternative action for damages, in the former situ-
ation, this loss to the plaintiff will be considered consequential damages and,
as such, recoverable. See 5 CORaIN, CONTRACTS §1107 (1951).
:5 See Fuller and Perdue, supra note 4.
16 On the concept of benefit, see 46 MIicH. L. REv. 543 (1948).
